Con Boutsianis: “The nation is not going to get better by just playing more games”

South Melbourne icon Con Boutsianis is steadfast in his view that issues in Australian football’s much-debated talent pathways are rooted in a lack of specialised, skill-specific training, and that higher game loads will not act as the panacea some believe it could be.

As the gears slowly grind towards the development of a National Second Division, and the rebranded A-League Youth (formerly Y-League) competition prepares for its return post-Covid-19, there is a general sentiment that the improvement of the game in Australia depends on the procurement of more football and added opportunities.

This has been a focus of the Australian Professional Leagues ahead of the new A-League Women’s campaign, who in June announced that within two years the competition will run as a 22-round home and away season that offers the global standard of 1,980 match minutes (before finals) per season.

The increase has been welcomed by all and sundry given the relatively low base of the fourteen match season from which it’s risen. But in the men’s game, Boutsianis is wary that more time on the pitch would cause further neglect to skill-specific training. Put simply, he feels the game wants to run before it can walk; or as he puts it, writing literature without the ability to spell.

“I use the alphabet as an example: when you know the alphabet, spelling words becomes easier. We don’t have a curriculum or syllabus that would suggest there is an alphabet in football, because if there was, every single club and academy in the world would teach players how to kick properly with both feet,” Boutsianis told Soccerscene.

“That doesn’t happen, so we know the system is discordant in some way. It’s important we understand what the basics are and how we improve them. The philosophy is very simple: learn the basics well, be able to kick with both feet, run with the ball well, be a good athlete, eat well, and nail all the things that are required to be a top line athlete.”

Without these fundamental structures in place, or without a unified idea across the board of what these fundamentals are, Boutsianis is of the belief that those holes will become exposed on the pitch, and that the pitch is not the environment to improve. 

“Everyone’s talking about game load. I use Graham Arnold as an example, his solution to development is playing more games. Yes, you get some experience, but there are other fundamental things that need to be improved on,” he said.

“Whether it’s fitness, mechanics, goalscoring, the technical aspect of kicking the ball on both feet; if those things aren’t being addressed, and then you say ‘we need to play more games’, all it’s showing me is what you can’t currently do. The nation is not going to become better by playing more games.”

Boutsianis speaks about Australian football at breakneck pace, with his undeniable passion tinged with evident frustration at the direction it’s taken. He frequently diverts the conversation between sports – be it basketball, table tennis or golf – arguing their secrets to success are transferable, but are being wasted.

“Ray Allen was the three-point shooting specialist in the NBA; he’d taken a year off his contract to improve his shooting, especially from the three-point line. He said ‘I don’t have time to improve while playing, I need the time to improve and I’ll come back next year.’”

“From there, he went on to be the all-time shooting champion in the NBA. Someone who’s superseded him now is Steph Curry, he’s taken it to another level. He can shoot at the three-point line, and go one, two, three metres back from there.

“In my experience, the data on football shows most goals are scored close to goal. That’s true, but they’re only analysing what happens, not how they can make it better. Of course if you’re closer to goal it’s easier to score, and if you’re 20-30 metres away it’s harder, but you should be able to do both.

“A fine example of that is Ronald Koeman, who scored 256 goals from his sweeper centre-back position. Because he was able to strike the ball the way he should, he scored. Everyone should be able to hit the ball fluently on both feet, but we get coached in a way that says ‘you’re not allowed to shoot as a defender, you’re only allowed to do this or that.’”

Boutsianis argues that with time away from match play comes the freedom to pull apart and remodel individual skills, with a focus on biomechanical movements in the body central to his Football First coaching business.

His methods helped US Women’s legend Carli Lloyd reconstruct her shooting technique mid-way through a career that finished as a two-time World Cup winner (nine goals) and two-time Olympic gold medallist (eight).

“I haven’t spoken to her for a while, but I know she’s finished up and is running her own academy. She’s a fine example, she’s the all-time leading goalscorer at the Olympics, I just taught her to refine her technique to score goals and make sure she used both sides of her body.

“It’s down to the biomechanics, the mechanical action we use to perform these skills. Table tennis has certain movements, swimming has certain movements. When you go to kick a ball, our players are making enormous errors mechanically, so we have to identify how the muscles work in a certain way and start teaching kids how to perform those exercises.

“The probability of one team winning against another is based around skill sets. If your skills are higher than the others, and you have wider skillsets that you can use faster and for longer, your probability of winning is higher.”

Discussion around Australian youth development rarely lasts long before the inevitable yearning for the halcyon days of the AIS system begins. Having trained in the system as part of the 1992 Barcelona Olympics squad, Boutsianis credits its quality, but argues its success was not solely dependent on the concentration of talent under one roof.

“I trained there, great establishment, but you’ve got to realise most of the players that got picked to go were already pretty good. If you go round to every individual that went there, Paul Trimboli, Mark Viduka, Josip Šimunić… they all have one thing in common. They practised on their own, for many hours a day,” he said.

“When you put them all in an environment like the AIS – and Ron Smith knows his stuff – of course things start to happen, but that for me is not the solitary reason they became that good. They were already busting their arses on their own. When Viduka was there he was hitting the ball against the wall, everyone told him to shut up. And he would not stop.”

The Socceroos head to their fifth consecutive World Cup this November with a playing group widely considered of lesser ability than four years ago, and certainly below that of 2006-2010. If Graham Arnold’s side perform admirably against France, Tunisia and Denmark but fail to win a game, as was the case in Russia under Bert van Marwijk, Boutsianis will be the last to pat them on the back for effort.

“The great Ferenc Puskás was my coach at South Melbourne. He told me something very important when I was eighteen: ‘if you don’t shoot, you can’t score.’ Now, if you can’t putt, you can’t win golf tournaments. Tiger Woods is a classic for it. He’ll say ‘I didn’t hold my putts.’”

“He doesn’t say ‘I deserved to win, I had plenty of chances’, like we hear coaches say. Why didn’t you take your chances? It’s all about execution at the highest level, and if you can’t execute, you can’t win.

“So why is it that we spend such little time on finishing? I know golfers who spend hours a day practising their putting. I know table tennis players that are ten years old who do four hours. We do ninety minutes of training a day at A-League level and expect to play at the highest level, and produce players to win the World Cup? Forget about it.”

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Manchester City must pay the ultimate price for financial cheating

Manchester City’s financial scandal has reached boiling point. On the 29th of September, an independent commission found City guilty of all charges relating to serious breaches of the league’s financial rules across nine seasons, from 2009/10 to 2017/18. The commission also upheld three of four charges concerning the club’s failure to cooperate with the Premier League investigation.

The Premier League says City used sham commercial arrangements and disguised owner funding to inflate revenue and reduce costs by more than $1.7 billion (£900 million). Abu Dhabi United Group funded $1.58 billion (£830.69 million) that appeared in City’s accounts as sponsorship money from Abu Dhabi companies. The commission concluded that City’s accounts concealed the true financial position from auditors and regulators.

The 115 charges cover inaccurate financial information, player and manager payments, financial rules and the investigation itself. City has lodged its appeal against the guilty verdict, but for such a serious sporting scandal, attention has already turned to the potential punishments. In a Premier League era where foreign investment is king and revenues have skyrocketed, we should be asking questions. How did Manchester City get away with this for so long, and how can the punishment act as a deterrent to keep the reputation of football’s biggest league intact?

The hack that exposed the story

The most uncomfortable part of this saga is how the authorities discovered it and how most likely City never would have been exposed. In 2018, German publication Der Spiegel published leaked internal City emails and documents obtained through Football Leaks. Rui Pinto, the Portuguese hacker behind Football Leaks, supplied material that alleged City had disguised owner investment as sponsorship revenue and manipulated arrangements to satisfy financial regulations.

The Premier League investigation began in December 2018. City were formally charged in February 2023, after a four-year investigation, and the hearing finally began in September 2024. That timeline is nothing short of extraordinary; eight years between the leaks being exposed and charges being brought to Manchester City does significant sporting damage.

Man City won eight major titles during the alleged period, including three Premier League titles. Recalling titles in any sport leaves a sour taste in any sports fan’s mouth. The fans of opposing sides given titles feel robbed of the special moment, and Manchester City fans could feel rightfully deceived. But it goes beyond even this as we look at who Manchester City signed during those seasons. Players such as Ilkay Gundogan and Kevin De Bruyne played vital roles in City’s later titles beyond the 2017/2018 season. Would they have joined if this had been uncovered earlier? It’s impossible to say, but it shows how City’s early investment from 2009/10 still contributed to their titles in the 2020’s.

The Premier League’s credibility

That delay is not just embarrassing for City; it damages the Premier League. The league is the most competitive and commercially powerful domestic competition in football. Its rules are supposed to create a framework in which clubs compete on sporting merit while remaining financially sustainable. If a club can allegedly distort its accounts by hundreds of millions of dollars and the process takes years to reach a verdict, despite City’s potential obstruction, every other club has a reason to question whether the system works.

The irony is obvious: if Football Leaks hadn’t shared what they found on Manchester City through its hack, the scheme never would have been uncovered. If financial rules were designed to stop clubs gaining an unfair competitive advantage, then the Premier League may need to change how it investigates how its clubs’ finances are being managed. If anything should be gained from this, it may be that financial regulation needs to be improved as the Premier League and its clubs spend billions.

As for Manchester City, punishment cannot simply be a fine that becomes another operating cost.

Relegation is the only serious answer

If the verdict survives the appeal, Manchester City should be removed from the Premier League and those three aforementioned league titles removed. A fine would be inadequate and, depending on what points deduction City got, would punish the club in one season while leaving the historical record largely intact. Nottingham Forest received a four point deduction for a charge of Profitability and Sustainability rules in 2023-2024. City’s 114 charges will see much greater punishment then that.

Even if City are relegated they would almost be guranteed to be promoted the next season so even that feels like a slap on the wrist. Despite their investment during the nine seasons being questioned their five titles subsequent to that period will be expected to remain in their hands. My solution is to relegate City to the Championship without the potential of promotion for three seasons, one for each title won during that time.

City fans will call that harsh but their is strong reason to come down hard and that’s because this is bigger than Manchester City. Foreign ownership has brought huge investment into English football, but investment cannot mean exemption from the rules. Owners, executives and clubs must know that the Premier League’s financial regulations carry consequences that cannot be negotiated away.

The league has a choice. It can impose a manageable punishment and move on, or it can demonstrate that competitive integrity matters more than the commercial power of its biggest clubs. If City’s appeal fails, the answer should be clear: relegation, a reckoning over the titles and a message to every owner that the Premier League’s rules are not optional.

Football must set financial rules of engagement following FIFA Forward Enterprise crisis

Never before has football had such deep access to capital, or faced such complex questions about what that means for the future of the sport.

Private equity firms are investing in clubs, institutional investors are moving into stadiums and sports infrastructure, and clubs are looking beyond broadcasting and matchday revenue towards property, hospitality, entertainment and technology.

The question is no longer whether football needs investments. It’s what happens when investment starts influencing the way the game is run.

The issue came sharply into focus this year when FIFA proposed creating FIFA Forward Enterprise, a new FIFA-owned subsidiary that would bring together its commercial and event operations. The concept would effectively place the World Cup, the crown jewel of global football and FIFA’s blue chip stock, inside an investable structure. 

The proposal envisaged raising up to $6 billion by selling minority, non-controlling stakes in the subsidiary to external investors, based on an initial valuation of $29 billion. FIFA said the additional capital would help increase development funding for its 211 member associations.

The proposal triggered a governance crisis, while major questions about Gianni Infantino’s tenure as FIFA President continue.

UEFA, CONCACAF and (to a lesser-extent) the AFC were among the confederations to object, variously stating they had learned about the proposal through media reports rather than through FIFA’s own consultation process.

Amid a firestorm of criticism, the proposal was ultimately abandoned.

Now, Gianni Infantino has proposed an independent review of the organisation’s governance framework for major strategic initiatives, including how responsibility is divided between the president, Bureau, Council and Congress.

That makes this bigger than one investment proposal.

It’s a debate about who should control football’s commercial future.

Capital isn’t the enemy

There is an obvious argument in favour of private investment.

Football is an expensive business.

At club level, the relationship between capital and football is becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex.

RC Lens recently brought infrastructure investor Entrepreneur Equity Partners into its ownership structure, with the club saying the investment will fund development around the Stade Bollaert-Delelis and help create new revenue opportunities beyond matchdays.

Alas, there is a cost that comes with the capital. 

Investors ultimately expect a financial return. This won’t always conflict with supporters’ interests, but it can create different priorities.

Whereas a supporter might value affordability, identity and competitive success, an investor might instead look at property development, hospitality, commercial growth and the long-term value of an asset.

Neither perspective is inherently wrong.

But problems begin when financial objectives and football objectives stop overlapping and start pointing in different directions.

The ownership question

Chelsea provides a useful example of how quickly football ownership can change.

Clearlake Capital has now taken full control of the London club after acquiring the stakes previously held by Todd Boehly and Mark Walter, in a transaction that values the club at around $9.5 billion including debt. Todd Boehly only invested in the club four years ago.

That does not mean Chelsea’s new ownership structure is better or worse than before.

It demonstrates something important about modern football.

Football is becoming an asset class

That is perhaps the biggest change.

Football is no longer simply something wealthy individuals buy because they love the sport.

It is increasingly being viewed by institutional investors as an asset class with multiple potential revenue streams.

That means the investment opportunity can extend beyond owning a club.

There is private capital in stadiums, infrastructure, media rights, technology, sponsorship businesses and surrounding property.

It also explains why the FIFA proposal was so significant.

FIFA was effectively exploring whether the enormous commercial value of its competitions could be packaged into an investable structure.

FIFA argued investors would hold minority positions and would not receive control over sporting decisions or governance. It also argued the additional commercial value could increase funding available to football associations around the world.

That is a legitimate commercial proposition.

But once an asset is valued in the billions and external investors are being invited to participate, questions about control inevitably follow.

Who decides which commercial opportunities are pursued?

What happens when investors want one thing and football stakeholders want another?

And perhaps most importantly, who ultimately gets the benefit from football becoming more valuable?

The danger isn’t investment. It’s misalignment.

Football should not pretend it can grow without capital.

Football today requires enormous amounts of it.

The challenge is ensuring investment strengthens the sport rather than gradually redefining what the sport means to fans.

There are good reasons for clubs to develop their stadiums, diversify revenue and attract institutional capital.

There are also good reasons for supporters, players, federations and communities to ask what they receive in return.

FIFA’s recent episode demonstrates how quickly these questions can become political as well as financial.

The fact FIFA is now considering an independent governance review following such backlash shows the debate is not simply about whether the investment proposal was commercially sensible, but also about how decisions of that scale should be made.

That may be the most important question for football’s next financial era.

Private capital is here to stay. The tap isn’t turning off.

So, it’s critical football determines its rules of engagement before the next billion-dollar proposal lands on the table.

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